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Abstract 
Bribe demands present a social conflict scenario where decisions have wide-ranging economic and 
ethical consequences. Nevertheless, such incidents occur daily in many countries across the globe. 
Harassment bribery constitute a significant sub-set of such bribery incidents where a government 
official demands a bribe for providing a service to a citizen legally entitled to it. We employ an 
evolutionary game-theoretic framework to analyse the evolution of corrupt and honest strategies in 
structured populations characterized by an interdependent complex network. The effects of changing 
network topology, average number of links and asymmetry in size of the citizen and officer 
population on the proliferation of incidents of bribery are explored.  A complex network topology is 
found to be beneficial for the dominance of corrupt strategies over a larger region of phase space 
when compared with the outcome for a regular network, for equal citizen and officer population sizes. 
However, the extent of the advantage depends critically on the network degree and topology. A 
different trend is observed when there is a difference between the citizen and officer population sizes. 
Under those circumstances, increasing randomness of the underlying citizen network can be 
beneficial to the fixation of honest officers up to a certain value of the network degree. Our analysis 
reveals how the interplay between network topology, connectivity and strategy update rules can affect 
population level outcomes in such asymmetric games. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corruption involving bribery is an example of a social conflict scenario which affects the lives of 
many people particularly in developing countries. The conflict arises when a service provider (corrupt 
officer) withholds a service from citizens until they pay a bribe. The bribes are called harassment 
bribes when citizens are legally entitled to the service. Examples of such bribes include bribes paid 
for obtaining identification cards, electricity & gas connections, driver’s license, etc. One way of 
discouraging such forms of corruption is by imposing a high penalty on such illegal transactions that 
are enforced by law. Punishment can be inflicted symmetrically on both bribe giver (who pays a bribe 
silently) and bribe taker (corrupt officer) or asymmetrically on only bribe taker (corrupt officer). Basu 
(Basu, 2011) suggested punishing only bribe takers in the case of harassment bribe will encourage 
citizens to act as whistle-blowers and hence would cut down incidents of bribery incidents. Several 
experimental and theoretical studies have been carried out to test the validity of the proposal since it 
was first suggested (Abbink et al., 2014; Basu et al., 2016; Dufwenberg and Spagnolo, 2015; Oak, 
2015; Ryvkin and Serra, 2013; Verma and Sengupta, 2015).  
 
The act of demanding harassment bribes showcases a conflict between a harasser (corrupt officer) 
and a harassed citizen. A corrupt officer would like to maximize his gain from exploiting citizens 
while simultaneously attempting to minimize the risk of being punished. A citizen subject to a bribe 
demand is faced with a different kind of economic as well as ethical dilemma. She must weigh the 
cost of paying a bribe against the cost of denial of service should she refuse to pay. The decisions 
taken in this context will depend on the bribe amount, the likelihood of redress following a complaint 
against the extorting officer, the cost incurred in lodging a complaint as well as other factors. The 
strategies adopted by the protagonists and the manner in which they are updated over time under the 
influence of connected neighbours has significant consequences on the prevalence and spread of such 
forms of corruption in society.  
 
Analysis of such types of social conflicts using evolutionary game theory can be insightful in several 
ways. Firstly, such a game provides a realistic model to explore the effects of punishment on reducing 
corruption and enabling ethical behaviour. Several recent studies (D’Orsogna et al., 2013; D’Orsogna 
and Perc, 2015; Helbing et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2017, 2015; McBride et al., 2016; Rand and Nowak, 
2011; Short et al., 2010; Sigmund, 2007; Szolnoki and Perc, 2013a, 2015) have begun to address the 
impact of punishment and reward on deterring criminal behaviour in mixed as well as structured 
populations. Such social conflicts characterized by competing interests and distinct strategies of 
interacting players also provides a natural framework for analysing evolutionary game dynamics on 
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interdependent networks. 
 
Initially, most studies on complex networks were focused on single networks (Barabasi and Albert, 
1999; Barrat et al., 2008; Callaway et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2000; Newman et al., 2006; Song et al., 
2005; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Networks in real life are often made up of interconnected and 
interdependent layers where each layer contains a network of nodes that can be different from those 
found in another layer (Danziger et al., 2014; Kenett et al., 2015). The interconnectedness of the two 
layers lead to their inter-dependence. The properties of such interacting networks can be quite 
different from that of a single network. A recent work on such interdependent infrastructure network 
reveals that small failures in a small part of one network may lead to catastrophic cascade of failures 
in another network (Buldyrev et al., 2010).  
 
Evolutionary games, especially those dealing with the spread of cooperative behaviour,  have been 
extensively analysed on a variety of networks with different topologies (Assenza et al., 2008; Fu et 
al., 2007; Gómez-Gardeñes et al., 2011, 2007; Kim et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2011; Masuda and Aihara, 
2003; Peña et al., 2009; Poncela et al., 2011, 2007; Santos et al., 2006; Santos and Pacheco, 2005). 
These works established that heterogeneity in network connection positively impacts the spread of 
cooperation in social dilemmas though its effect is limited by payoff normalization (Masuda, 2007; 
Santos and Pacheco, 2006; Szolnoki et al., 2008; Tomassini et al., 2007). Recently, a number of 
studies have begun to focus on the conditions for spread of cooperation on interdependent networks 
(Gómez-Gardeñes et al., 2012; Jiang and Perc, 2013; Szolnoki and Perc, 2013b; B. Wang et al., 2012; 
Wang et al., 2013a, 2013b; Z. Wang et al., 2012). For example, it has been found that an intermediate 
interdependence between two interacting networks promotes cooperation in the population (Jiang and 
Perc, 2013) and unbiased coupling of payoffs of two network leads to the emergence of 
interdependent network reciprocity (Wang et al., 2013a). Hence properties pertaining to 
interdependence among players of two networks can be exploited to promote cooperation in different 
social dilemmas. 
 
A common theme of all these papers is the symmetric nature of interaction among players within and 
across the networks with the players being identified only by their strategies. In nature, however, intra 
and inter network interactions are mostly asymmetric. This asymmetry may arise due to intrinsic 
differences in the nature of two interacting networks, environmental and genetic factors, hierarchical 
social structure or because players have different social roles. Asymmetric interactions can be 
modelled through asymmetric games also referred to in the literature as bi-matrix games 
(Gaunersdorfer et al., 1991; McAvoy and Hauert, 2015). The bribery game is a typical example of an 
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asymmetric game where citizens and officers interact with each other but can only imitate strategies 
of members belonging to their own populations. Thus, we have one interaction graph connecting 
officers & citizens and two replacement graphs, one each for citizen and officer populations, 
specifying the connections within those populations. This framework of interdependent network 
interaction and dynamics can be extended to other asymmetric social conflicts as well.  
 
In our previous work we had employed the evolutionary game theoretical model to test the validity 
of the hypothesis for reducing bribery incidents, proposed by Basu in a mixed (Verma and Sengupta, 
2015) as well as a structured (Verma et al., 2017) population represented by a regular interdependent 
network. In a mixed population scenario (Verma and Sengupta, 2015)  we found that imposing the 
asymmetric punishment scheme may not suffice in reducing incidents of harassment bribery. Factors 
such as how players update their strategies, the cost of complaining incurred by harassed citizens and 
bribe amount demanded by corrupt officers plays a significant role in determining the prevalence of 
corrupt officers in the population at equilibrium. Subsequently, we also found (Verma et al., 2017) 
that incidents of bribery can be considerably reduced in a structured population represented by a 
regular inter-dependent network, in comparison to the mixed population scenario. Another key 
feature of such networks was the optimal range of connectivity of the nodes in the citizen and 
interaction networks that facilitated fixation of honest officers.  While regular networks offer some 
insight into the role of underlying population structure and connectivity, real-world social networks 
are more complex and described by either small-world or scale-free networks. The main motivation 
of the current work is to understand how heterogeneity in network connections of both citizen and 
officer networks (implying differences in influencing individual behaviour by connected neighbours) 
together with asymmetry in the citizen and officer population sizes impact the spread of honest 
officers in the asymmetric penalty scenario. As in the previous work, we have focused primarily on 
varying two important parameters of the bribery game namely, bribe amount ( )b  demanded by the 
corrupt officer and cost of complaining ( )t  incurred by complaining citizens. This was based on the 
grounds that these two parameters are more easily controlled than the others. Parameters such as 
amount of punishment imposed and prosecution rates can vary across states and even jurisdictions 
and changes are more likely to depend on fickle political processes.  Nevertheless, we have also 
analysed the effect of varying bribe amount (b) and punishment (po) on the equilibrium distribution 
of strategies in the population. 
 
We find that a change in network topology from regular to small-world to random adversely affects 
the spread of honest officers in certain regions of parameter space. However, the extent of the decrease 
in dominance of honest officers and complaining citizens depends on the rewiring probability and the 
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average number of links per citizen in the network. As in the case of regular networks, reduction in 
incidents of bribery over the parameter space is maximized for an optimal value of citizen network 
degree. However, this no longer holds for a completely random network.   
 
The behaviour is reversed if an asymmetry exists in the population sizes of the citizens and officers. 
In this case, the success of honest officers is maximized when the network degree is minimum with 
an initial increase in degree leading to a sharp drop in the fixation of honest officers. Subsequent 
increase in the degree of the citizen network aids in the fixation of honest officers. Moreover, 
increasing randomness of the citizen network encourages the spread of honest officers.  
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Bribery game and update rule 
We start with two sets of population, one of officers and the other of citizens as shown in the 
schematic Fig. 1. Officers are connected with citizens through a regular interaction network (network 
3) of degree IN and with other officers through an intra-officer network (network 1) of average degree 
ON . Citizens, similarly are connected among themselves through intra-citizen network (network 2) 
of average degree CN . IN  defines the number of officer(s) each citizen interacts with. The interaction 
network specifies how citizens play the bribery game with officers while the intra-citizen and intra-
officer networks determine how a citizen and an officer updates their respective strategies by 
consulting connected neighbours in their corresponding networks.  Depending upon their own 
strategies as well as strategies of opponents, players receive payoffs. The payoff matrix for the bribery 
game is given by: 
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Fig. 1: Schematic diagram of interdependent network system of evolutionary game. Players in 
network 1 and 2 denoted by circles are connected with orange and green links respectively. Players 
of network 1 and 2 are connected through inter-network 3 represented by blue dashed links. Players 
of both population are also connected among themselves and update their strategies via intra-network 
(network 1 and 2). Topologies of network 1, 2 and 3 plays an important role in deciding the 
evolutionary fate of the population. 
 
When a citizen irrespective of her strategy interacts with an honest officer ( 1O ), the officer and citizen 
receive a fixed payoff of c  and v  respectively. If the officer is corrupt ( 2O ), payoff depends on the 
strategy of citizen. Citizens who pay the bribe amount b silently to the corrupt officer are apathetic 
citizens ( 1C ). Those who pay the bribe and complain to the concerned authorities are conscientious 
citizens ( 2C ). Citizens who refuse to pay the bribe and then complain are called honest citizens ( 3C ). 
Complaining citizens ( 2C and 3C ) also have to bear the cost of complaining t . Not all complaints 
lead to the prosecution of corrupt officers, it happens with the probability of prosecution k . When 
prosecuted, 2O  and 2C  must pay a penalty amounting to op  and cp  respectively. 2O  is punished for 
taking the bribe and 2C  is punished for giving a bribe. In the asymmetric penalty scenario, when 
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citizens are not liable for giving bribes, no punishment is levied on the citizens ( 0cp  ). r is the 
refund 2C  gets when 2O  is prosecuted for taking a bribe, which happens with probability k . All our 
results are obtained for the asymmetric liability with refund ( r b ) scenario.  
 
If 1IN  , an officer plays the game with IN  citizens per round. After bribery game is played between 
citizens and officers via the interaction network, the payoffs of each of the officers are averaged (over 
IN  interactions with citizens) and strategies of both citizens and officers are updated. The strategy 
update happens within the networks of respective population via a synchronous update process in 
which the entire population is updated simultaneously following the interactions. The player chosen 
for updating her strategy is called the 'focal player'. Focal player compares her payoff with the payoff 
of one of a randomly chosen neighbour known as ‘role model’. If the payoff of focal player ( f ) is 
greater than or equal to that of the role model ( r ) then focal player retains her original strategy. If 
fr   , the focal individual imitates the role model's strategy with a probability given by: 
     
)max( 


 fr
 
where max( )  is the maximum possible payoff difference between any two players belonging to 
the same population. The process of interaction and population update is continued until the code has 
run for a fixed number of generations or until one of the officers’ strategies gets fixed in the 
population, whichever is earlier. 
 
'Small-world' networks represent a more realistic model of social networks and are marked by their 
short characteristic path length as compared to the regular networks. This implies that any individual 
node can be reached from any other node by traversing a small number of links. Such a network can 
be formed by rewiring a regular network via Watts-Strogatz algorithm where each link from the node 
is removed from one end with probability p  and reconnected to a node chosen uniformly at random 
(avoiding self-loops and link duplication). Rewiring each link of a regular network allows the 
rewiring probability p  to be used as a tuneable parameter that allows the network topology to change 
from a regular ( 0p  ) to completely random ‘Erdos-Renyi’ network ( 1p  ). We did not allow the 
network to evolve in a manner that results in more than one connected component. 
 
Small-world character of a network is obtained for a low value of p , typically around the value of 
0.10 (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) subject to the additional criteria ln( )C CN CN N . This condition 
is satisfied in our case for 10CN   when 100CN   and 100CN   when 1000CN  .Nevertheless, we 
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varied CN  across a wide range since we wanted to study the effect of varying network connectivity 
as the network topology changes from a regular to a completely random one. We ensured that the 
evolution of the network because of rewiring did not result in a network with more than one connected 
component. We also examined the effect of scale-free network topology (Barabasi and Albert, 1999) 
on the prevalence of bribery by constructing scale-free citizen network following the Barabasi-Albert 
method of network growth via preferential attachment. We start with a fixed number ( 0m ) of all 
connected nodes 0m . New nodes are linked to m (< 0m ) existing nodes with probability proportional 
to the degree of existing nodes. In this way, new nodes are more likely to attach to nodes of higher 
degree than nodes with a lower degree. The number of new links ( m ) that are connected to existing 
nodes decide the average degree per node of the network. The network topology did not change during 
the course of the game even though the nodes themselves, representing strategies employed by a 
citizen and officer could change during the strategy update process.  
 
When rewiring probability p  increases, a close look at the equilibrium distribution reveals that for a 
few values of b  & t , honest and corrupt officers coexist at the equilibrium although the fraction of 
one of these two strategies is much less than the other. Such coexistences can be attributed to be 
artefacts of the rewiring process. It is possible that the rewiring of a connection between the pair of 
nearest-neighbour citizens that define a cluster boundary leaves the two clusters unconnected. Such 
a structure can lead to the coexistence of 1O  and 2O  officers because a single such officer is unable 
to change her strategy. When the probability of rewiring increases, chances of having network 
structures favouring such coexistence increases. Therefore, the region of parameter space where 1O  
and 2O  officers coexisted increases with rewiring probability. When we allow each officer to flip her 
strategy with a small mutation probability 
410   at each time step, such artefacts disappear, and 
the equilibrium concentrations exhibit no coexistence of 1O  and 2O  officers. The strategy flipping 
probability (  ) is much smaller than the strategy update probability and hence does not affect the 
update dynamics in any way. We used this value of e to generate all figures.  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
In this and subsequent sections, we present results to show the effect of rewiring of the citizen 
network, officer network, variations in citizen network connectivity, asymmetry in the size of citizen 
and officer populations on the prevalence of bribery. Since scale-free networks provide an alternative 
mode of constructing social networks, we also examine how the scale-free network topology of the 
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citizen population affects the spread of corrupt officers. 
 
3.1 Effect of rewiring the citizen's network 
 
Fig. 2: Equilibrium distribution (averaged over 100 realizations) of officers (upper panel) and citizens 
(lower panel) with increasing rewiring probability of citizen's network and small mutation ( 410  ) 
in officer's population for (a) 0p   (regular) (b) 0.1p   (c) 0.4p   and (d) 1.0p   (completely 
random). The colours in the upper panel represent the fraction of corrupt officers (O2) while those in 
the lower panel represent the fraction of citizens employing one of the three possible strategies. Black 
indicates fraction of O2 is 1. Green, blue and red colors represent points where the fraction of citizens 
who pay silently ( 1C ), pay & complain ( 2C ) and refuse to pay ( 3C ) respectively, is 1. Fixed parameter 
in the simulation: 100CN  , 100ON  , 1IN  , 2CN  , 2ON  , 1,v  1,c  0.4,k  2,op  0,cp 
r b . 
 
 
Fig. 3: Fraction of phase space hof (averaged over 100 realizations) for which honest officers can get 
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fixed is plotted against (a) rewiring probability of citizen's network p  for different values of CN . 
Increasing randomness of citizen's network negatively impacts the spread of honest officers over 
phase space. (b) 
hof  versus CN  for different values of rewiring probability p . Other parameters are 
fixed to 100CN  , 100ON  , 1IN  , 2CN  , 2ON  , 
410 ,   1,v   1,c   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   
r b .  
 
 Initially we chose to rewire the citizen’s network only since it is more likely to have a complex 
network topology due to each citizen forming a variety of connections with friends and relatives, 
thereby being in a position to influence and be influenced by their connected neighbours. The service 
providing officers on the other hand are more likely to be influenced by connected counterparts in the 
same office and their chances of forming long-range connections with other officers providing the 
same service are relatively low. Hence it seems reasonable to consider the officer network to be a 
regular one in contrast to the more complex topology of the citizen network. We start with symmetric 
populations of size 100O CN N   with 2ON CN   and 1IN  . Fig.2 shows the equilibrium 
concentration of different strategies for varying bribe amount b  and cost of complaining t . In Fig. 
2(a) ( 0p  ) for a high cost of complaining ( ~ 2 / 3t or more), both corrupt officers and corresponding 
apathetic citizens get fixed in the population. On the other hand, for low values of t , the spread of 
honest officers in the population is accompanied by increase in the concentration of conscientious 
and honest citizens. For high bribe amount and low cost of complaining, honest citizens play an 
important role in turning the tide towards the fixation on honest officers. As the citizen network 
topology changes from regular to small-world, honest officers are found to prevail only for a lower 
cost of complaining except when bribe demanded is very high. In that regime, the presence of honest 
citizens who refuse to pay the bribe ( 3C ) tips the balance in favour of honest officers (lower panels 
of Fig. 2a, b). For 2CN  , with further increase in rewiring probability of the citizen network, the 
region of b t  phase space over which honest officers can get fixed ( hof ) decreases (Fig.3a). Hence 
increasing the randomness of citizen network negatively impacts the fixation of honest officers in the 
population. Fig.4(a) and (b) shows the effect of going from a small-world ( 0.1p  ) to a completely 
random ( 1p  ) network on the population dynamics for a specific parameter set. Even though 
strategies were randomly distributed across the initial population of citizens and officers, we find 
interacting clusters forming very quickly between apathetic citizens ( 1C ) & corrupt officers ( 2O ) and 
complaining citizens ( 2C  and 3C ) & honest officers ( 1O ). However, the strategy update dynamics 
leads to distinct outcomes in the two cases with corrupt officers prevailing when the citizen network 
is random. Movies showing the update dynamics that eventually leads to fixation of honest and 
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corrupt officers for 0.1p  , 2CN    (Movie 1a) and 1p  , 2CN   (Movie 1b), 0.1p  , 20CN 
(Movie 1c) and 1p  , 20CN   (Movie 1d) respectively for small ( 2CN  ) and large ( 20CN  ) 
values of the citizen network degree are available as Supplementary Material. 
 
Fig. 4: Time evolution of strategies employed by officers (upper panel) and citizens (lower panel) at 
fixed values of bribe amount ( b ), cost of complaining ( t ) for symmetric (a & b) and asymmetric (c 
& d) citizen populations sizes for two different rewiring probabilities. (a) 100,CN   100,ON   0.1p   
(b) 100,CN   100,ON   1.0p   (c) 1000,CN   100,ON   0.1p   (d) 1000,CN   100,ON   1.0p  . 
Black and white colors represent corrupt and honest officers respectively. Green, blue and red colors 
represent citizens who pay silently ( 1C ), pay & complain ( 2C ) and refuse to pay ( 3C ) respectively. 
Other parameters are: 1,IN   2,ON   1,v   1,c   0.2,b   0.5,t   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b . 
 
An analysis of the strategy-update dynamics suggests a plausible qualitative explanation for these 
results.  Usually after a few successive updates, corrupt officers ( 2O ) form interacting clusters with 
apathetic citizens ( 1C ) and honest officers ( 1O ) form interacting clusters with complaining citizens 
( 2C  and 3C ). The strategy-update dynamics at the cluster boundary determines the growth of one and 
corresponding shrinkage of the other cluster, and such processes can lead to the eventual fixation of 
a specific strategy in the population over time. In regular networks, the strategy of individuals at the 
boundary of a cluster can influence those of their connected neighbours in the adjacent cluster. This 
makes the spread of honest officers and complaining citizens favourable under certain conditions. 
However, an increase in rewiring probability which leads to the establishment of long-range 
connections (at the cost of near-neighbour connections) in the citizen network can reduce the ability 
of individuals at a cluster boundary to influence counterparts in the adjacent cluster because they may 
no longer be connected neighbours after the rewiring process. This effect is prominent for low to 
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moderate values of CN . As CN  increases, the decrease in hof  becomes less pronounced (see coloured 
lines in Fig. 3a) and eventually disappears for very large CN  (black line Fig. 3a) when the degree of 
the citizens network is large enough to influence neighbours lying in different clusters. The 
detrimental effects of increasing randomness of the citizen network is offset by a large network degree 
that ensures majority of the nodes are connected. 
 
The average degree of the citizen network has a significant effect on fraction of the b t  parameter 
space for which honest officers get fixed in the population. Supplementary Figures 1 and 2 depicts 
the equilibrium concentrations of different strategies in both the citizen and officer networks for 
0.1p   and 1p   respectively as CN  is varied. It is clear from Supplementary Fig. 1 that there exists 
an optimal value of CN  which facilitates fixation of honest officers. This is summarized in Fig. 3b 
where the variation of
hof  with the average network degree ( CN ) is plotted for different values of p . 
We observe that the area of b t space over which honest officers dominate is highest for 6CN   
(Fig. 3b). When the citizen network becomes completely random (see Supplementary Fig. 2), no such 
optimality with CN  is observed. An increase in CN  leads to a rapid initial increase in hof up to a 
point beyond which 
hof nearly saturates with further increase in CN  since the advantage of increasing 
CN  follows the law of diminishing returns. The blue line in Fig. 3b clearly depicts this trend. As the 
degree of the citizen network approaches the size of the network, the effect of increasing randomness 
of the network on 
hof  gradually diminishes as can be seen from the clustering of hof  values for 
different p in Fig.3b  
 
Since increasing the randomness of citizen's network facilitates the spread of corrupt officers (Fig. 2) 
when the officer network was regular, we also wanted to examine the effect of simultaneously 
increasing the randomness of both the citizen and officer networks. When both networks are rewired 
with same probability ( 'p ), the area of parameter space over which honest officers get fixed decreases 
significantly compared to the case when only the citizen network is rewired as shown in 
Supplementary Fig. 3. Rewiring of the officer network is detrimental to the spread of honest officers 
for the same reason as the rewiring of citizen network.  
 
3.2 Asymmetric population size 
In realistic scenarios, an officer providing a service typically interacts with many citizens seeking the 
service. Hence the citizen population is expected to be larger than the officer population. To 
understand the effect of asymmetric population size we carried out simulations where the citizen’s 
population was 10-100 times larger than the officer’s population. This means there are 10-100 citizens 
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connected to each officer through the interaction network. However, each citizen is still connected to 
IN  officers and the larger size of the citizen population does not change IN . The b-t diagram of 
equilibrium frequencies of officer and citizens shows that increasing the randomness of citizen's 
network increases the parameter space for honest officer to dominate (Fig.5), with the increase 
coming primarily from the region of parameter space characterized by low bribe-amount.  
 
Fig.4(c) and (d) depicts the evolution of officer and citizen strategies over time as the degree of 
randomness changes from ( 0.1p  ) to a completely random ( 1p  ) network and shows that 
increasing randomness favours fixation of honest officers for the specified parameter set. This trend 
is the opposite of what we observed for the symmetric population case (Fig.2), though it is worth 
emphasizing the absolute value of 
hof  was much higher across the entire range of p values in the 
latter case as can be observed by comparing the black line with coloured lines in Fig. 6a. Fig. 4(c) 
and (d) further reveal a strong correlation between the dominance of apathetic citizens within the 
blocks of 10 citizens that interact with a single officer and the eventual fixation of corrupt officers. 
In Fig. 4(d), the strategies of citizens within a block are more heterogeneously distributed. This 
prevents corrupt officers from increasing their payoff by exploiting a large number of apathetic 
citizens within a block and inhibits their spread in the officer population.  
 
Fig.5: Equilibrium distribution (averaged over 10 realizations) of officers (upper panel) and citizens 
(lower panel) for increasing rewiring probability of citizen's network and asymmetric population with 
parameters 1000CN  , 100ON  , 1IN  , 2CN  , 2ON  (a) 0p   (b) 0.1p   (c) 0.4p   and (d) 
1.0p  . Other fixed parameters are 410 ,   1,v   1,c   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b . 
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Fig. 6: Fraction of phase space 
hof (averaged over 100 realizations) for which honest officers can get 
fixed is plotted against (a) rewiring probability of citizen's network p for different values of 
CN for 
(a) 6CN   (b) 60CN  (c) hof  as function of CN  for different p  when 1000CN  .Other parameters 
are fixed to 100,ON   1,IN   2,ON   
410 ,   1,v   1,c   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b . 
 
When CN  is small and a group of 10 citizens interact with the same officer, the strategies of citizens 
within the block of 10 are less likely to be influenced by strategies of citizens in an adjacent block 
when 0p   (regular network). Complaining citizens in the interior of the 10-citizen block when 
interacting with a corrupt officer receives a lower payoff and is therefore more likely to imitate their 
apathetic neighbours within the block. Change in strategies of such citizens are controlled by change 
in the corresponding officer’s strategy. However, when p  increases, a citizen within a block can 
acquire connections with citizens in other blocks. She can therefore influence and be influenced by 
those citizens as well, and not just by their connected neighbours within a block. This influence of 
their connected neighbours in other blocks reduces the ability of the corresponding officer to control 
the citizens’ strategy through their interaction. This leads to faster variation in citizen’s strategies 
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within a block and is beneficial for the spread of honest officers. This advantage exists as long as the 
degree of the citizen’s network is approximately less than the block size. As the degree CN  increases, 
the ability of each citizen to influence interacting partners in other blocks increases.  Thus, increasing 
p  provides no additional advantage to honest officers and this is seen by comparing the variation of 
the green and blue lines with p  in Fig. 6a ( 6CN  ) and Fig. 6b ( 60CN  ). In the former case, a 
slight increase in 
hof  is observed on changing the citizen network from regular to random. In contrast, 
in the latter case, 
hof  remains unchanged on varying the rewiring probability unless CN  is increased 
to 10,000 which corresponds to the situation where a group of 100 citizens interact with a single 
officer. Fig. 6c shows the variation of 
hof  with the degree of the citizen network for a fixed ratio 
( / 10C ON N  ) of citizen to officer population sizes. A contrast with the symmetric population case is 
noteworthy here. In that case, we found an optimal value of CN  which maximizes hof  (see Fig. 2). 
In the asymmetric population case, this is observed only for 0p  . As p  increases, the peak vanishes 
and for non-zero rewiring probability, an initial increase in CN  leads to a decrease in hof  with the 
extent of the drop depending on the degree of randomness of the citizen network. Subsequent increase 
in CN  leads to a gradual increase in hof  which eventually saturates at a value that is independent of 
the rewiring probability of the citizen network. 
 
In Fig. 6c ( 0 1p  ), an increase in CN  increases intra-block connections, facilitating the spread of 
apathetic citizens (
1C ) since payoff of 1C  is greater than 2C  and 3C  when playing against corrupt 
officers (
2O ). If number of complaining citizens within the block are high, payoff of 1O  would be 
greater than 
2O  hence 2O  would not spread. However, when the number of apathetic citizens ( 1C ) 
becomes sufficiently large within the block, corrupt officer gets stabilised ( 2 1O O  ) and can replace 
1O . Initially, an increase in CN  can only increase intra-block connection to the extent where all 
citizens within the block are connected; therefore hof  reaches a minimum when CN  approaches 
number of citizens within a block ( / 10C ON N   in our case). Further increase in CN  increases the 
adjacent inter-block connections which does not give enough time for 2O  to get stabilised hence 1O  
can spread more easily (
2 3,C C  against 1O  > 1 2 3, ,C C C    against 2O ) leading to the increase in hof  
from its minimum value. The advantage of inter-block connections in facilitating the spread of honest 
officer diminishes when the citizen network approaches a complete graph (where all citizens are 
connected with every other citizen) hence hof  eventually saturates for very high CN  (Fig. 6c).   
 
We also analysed the consequence of increasing the rewiring probability (Supplementary Fig.4) and 
citizen network degree (Supplementary Fig.5) in the parameter space obtained by varying punishment 
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(po) and bribe amount (b). In contrast with the mixed population scenario, increasing the penalty on 
corrupt officials makes no positive impact for low bribe amounts in populations characterized by 
small-world networks. As the randomness of the underlying social network increases, a high penalty 
increases the likelihood of fixation of honest officers due to the increase in number of complaining 
citizens. A similar trend in observed as the citizen network degree is increased for the underlying 
small-world network characterized by 0.1p   
 
3.3 Scale-free network 
Many real networks possess the scale-free property characterized by a power law degree distribution. 
In such networks, a small number of individuals (labelled as hubs) have a large number of links while 
most of the others have a relatively small number of connections. By their very nature, the hubs have 
the ability to influence and be influenced by a much larger set of connected citizen neighbours 
compared to other individuals in the network. We examined the effect of varying the average citizen 
network degree ( CN ) on the prevalence of bribery. Fig. 7 shows the phase plot obtained for scale-
free citizen's network with different average degree. Increase in CN  decreases the area of the 
parameter space over which honest officers can prevail. The change is especially significant in the 
low- b , moderate to high- t  region of parameter space. This trend is quite similar to the result obtained 
in for the random network case (see blue curve in Fig. 6c). Scale-free networks are different from 
random networks because of the presence of a small number of ‘hubs’ (nodes with a higher degree) 
but they are also similar in some respects. In the scale-free network, citizens within the blocks are 
more likely to be connected with citizens outside their blocks. Greater inter-block connections 
facilitate the spread of honest officers in the population like in case of the completely random network 
( 1p  ).Increasing the average degree CN  leads to increase in the number of intra-block connections 
(links within the block) which helps in the spread of apathetic citizens and corrupt officers (indirectly) 
resulting in the decrease of 
hof . When the average degree ( CN ) approaches the population size, the 
network tends towards one described by a complete graph. Hence further increase in CN  has little 
effect on the value of 
hof . The effect of greater heterogeneity in the degree of the scale-free network 
is also diluted since the payoffs of individual citizens are averaged over number of connected 
neighbors before each population update via imitation.  
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Fig.7: Equilibrium distribution (averaged over 100 realizations) for officers (upper panel) and citizens 
(lower panel) with increasing CN for scale-free citizen's network (constructed via Barabasi-Albert 
algorithm) with parameter 1000CN  , 100ON  , 1IN  , 2ON  , initial number of nodes: 0 1m m  , 
(a) 2CN  , 1m   (b) 4CN  , 2m   (c) 8CN  , 4m   and (d) 40CN  , 20m  . Other fixed 
parameters in the simulation: 410 ,   1,v   1,c   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b . 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our work provides important insights into collective behavioural outcomes in social conflicts and 
reveals how those outcomes depend on the underlying organization of the population. Our results 
show how changes in individual decisions that are affected by the nature of the social network can 
lead to emergence of population-level outcomes that could not be predicted on the basis of individual 
interactions only. The underlying social structure and the number of connections each individual 
possesses, plays a key role in determining how individual behaviours change under the influence of 
connected neighbours and how the effect of such changes percolate through the population.  
 
For identical citizen and officer population sizes, the region of parameter space for which honest 
officers can get fixed in the population decreases when citizen network's topology changes from 
regular to random. Making citizen's network more random increases the likelihood of severing of 
near-neighbour links and establishment of long-range links between citizens. This limits a citizen's 
ability to influence other citizens and hence other officers in her vicinity thereby hindering the growth 
of clusters of honest officers. Increasing the average number of links per node ( CN ) for the citizen 
network ensures increased near neighbour connections and offsets the negative effect of increasing 
network randomness leading to a slower decrease in hof that eventually flattens out as the network 
degree approaches the network size. Random rewiring of links does not have much effect on an almost 
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completely connected citizen network. As in the case of regular network (Verma et al., 2017), a peak 
in 
hof  for an optimal network degree is also observed as long as the network topology is not 
completely random (i.e. 1p  ). 
 
When the number of service seekers are larger in comparison to service providers, more citizens visit 
the same officer to access the service resulting in the interaction of a block of citizens with a single 
officer. In general, an increasing asymmetry (implying larger citizen block size per officer) between 
the citizen and officer population sizes facilitates spread of corrupt officers over a larger region of 
parameter space for all complex network topologies obtained by varying the rewiring probability. 
However, the effect of varying rewiring probability on 
hof depends on the network degree. When the 
degree exceeds the block size ( /C ON N ), the ability of citizens to influence their counterparts in 
neighbouring blocks nullifies the effect of increasing rewiring probability on 
hof . On the other hand, 
when the degree is less than or comparable to the block size, an honest citizen’s influence is mostly 
restricted within a block. Links across blocks becomes more important than links within the blocks 
for the spread of honest officers in this scenario. Increasing the rewiring probability facilitates the 
establishment of long-range inter-block links and thereby aids the expansion of clusters of honest 
citizens with a resulting increase in 
hof . Intriguingly, for a non-zero rewiring probability, increasing 
CN  initially has a detrimental effect on the spread of honest officers in some regions of parameter 
space. Such an increase ensures increased connectivity of citizens within a block. The payoff structure 
then helps in faster spreading of apathetic citizens within a block. This has a cascading effect by first 
increasing the payoff of the corrupt officer which in turn leads to the rapid spread of corrupt officers. 
Subsequently, this effect is modulated when further increase in CN  establishes links across blocks 
and allows citizens to influence counterparts in other blocks.   
 
The results presented here indicates how the intricate interplay between interaction across networks, 
rules for changing individual behaviour and network connectivity lead to complex evolutionary 
dynamics of the competing strategies. The outcome is manifest through shifting phase boundaries in 
parameter space. Our analysis while specific to bribery games can be easily generalized to any 
symmetric or asymmetric games. Exploring the effect of changing the topology of the interaction 
network and the consequences of introducing an overlap between the interaction and update networks 
are exciting directions for future explorations. Such investigations will lead to improved 
understanding of the complex dynamics of cooperation and conflict that underscore evolutionary 
games on interdependent networks.  
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Our results for complex interdependent networks indicate that in contrast to regular networks, corrupt 
officers and apathetic citizens proliferate more rapidly when the bribe-amount demanded is low and 
cost of complaining is moderate to high. Reducing the cost of complaining would be an effective 
means of reducing incidents of bribery but the extent of reduction necessary, depends non-trivially 
on the social organization including the average number of connections each citizen possesses. Hence, 
policies designed to reduce corruption need to take into account the underlying social structure in 
order to be effective. We believe our work can inform more effective policy-making to combat 
harassment bribery.  
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Supplementary Figures 
Supplementary Fig. 1: Equilibrium distribution for officers (upper panel) and citizens (lower panel) 
with increasing CN  with parameters 100CN  , 100ON  , 1IN  , 2ON   and 0.1p  for (a) 2CN   
(b) 6CN   (c) 20CN   and (d) 50CN  . Other fixed parameters in the simulation: 1,v   1,c   
0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b , 
410  . 
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Supplementary Fig. 2: Equilibrium distribution for officers (upper panel) and citizens (lower panel) 
with increasing CN  with parameter 100CN  , 100ON  , 1IN  , 2ON  , and 1p   (citizen network 
is completely random) for (a) 2CN   (b) 6CN   (c) 20CN   and (d) 50CN  . Other fixed 
parameters in the simulation: 1,v   1,c   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b , 
410  . 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. 3: Equilibrium distribution for officers (upper panel) and citizens (lower panel) 
for increasing rewiring probability of both citizen's and officer's network with parameter 100CN  , 
100ON  , 1IN  , 2ON  , (a) ' 0p p   (b) ' 0.1p p   (c) ' 0.4p p   and (d) ' 1p p  . Other 
fixed parameters are 1,v   1,c   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b , 
410  . Increasing randomness of 
both citizen's and officer's network hinders the spread of honest officer in the population.  
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Supplementary Fig. 4: Equilibrium distribution of officers (upper panel) and citizens (lower panel) 
for different bribe-amount (b) and penalty imposed on corrupt officers (po). The rewiring probability 
of citizen's network corresponds to (a) 0p   (regular) (b) 0.1p   (c) 0.4p   and (d) 1.0p   
(completely random). Fixed parameter in the simulation: 1000CN  , 100ON  , 1IN  , 6CN  , 
2ON  , 1,v  1,c  0.4,k  0.1,t  0,cp  r b , 
410  . 
 
 
Supplementary Fig. 5: Equilibrium distribution for officers (upper panel) and citizens (lower panel) 
in the b-po parameter space, showing the effect of increasing CN  with parameter 1000CN  , 100ON  , 
1IN  , 2ON  , and 0.1p    (a) 2CN   (b) 6CN   (c) 20CN   and (d) 50CN  . Other fixed 
parameters in the simulation: 1,v   1,c   0.4,k   0.1,t   0,cp   r b , 
410  . 
 
Supplementary Movie 1: The videos show the evolution of strategies of citizens and officers in their 
respective networks over time. Populations of both citizens and officers are initialized with an equal 
number of randomly distributed players for each strategy. Black and white nodes represent corrupt 
and honest officers respectively. Green, blue and red nodes represent citizens who pay silently ( 1C ), 
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pay & complain ( 2C ) and refuse to pay ( 3C ) respectively. Officers are embedded on a network with 
regular linear chain topology with 2ON  . Citizens, on the other hand, are embedded in a network 
characterized by (a) 0.1,p  2CN   (b) 1,p  2CN   (c) 0.1,p  20CN   (d) 1,p  20CN  . Each 
officer is also connected with a citizen directly below it with the degree of the interaction network 
being 1IN  . Other simulation parameters are fixed to the following values:  50,CN   50,ON   1,v   
1,c   0.2,b   0.5,t   0.4,k   2,op   0,cp   r b . 
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